Japan and China Relations: Between Escalation and Reconciliation

Takaichi speaks at the National Diet (author: Cabinet Public Affairs Office)

Relations between Japan and China have been rocky at best since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi commented in November 2025 on the potential involvement of the Japanese self-defence force in the case of a Chinese attempt to use military power to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The comment unleashed a diplomatic crisis between the two neighbours, with the Chinese government even dis-encouraging its nationals from travelling to Japan. However, recent statements made by the Japanese head of government suggest that relations may be moving toward normalisation.

Japan's and China’s relations have been complicated since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, a conflict that is still vividly remembered by Chinese nationals to this day and that ended with the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Still, the two countries are both regional economic powerhouses, and their geographical proximity has naturally led to the development of strong trade relations. Japan is especially dependent on Chinese imports of rare earths and other resources, as the country’s national resources are extremely scarce. However, this economic cooperation is also a source of risk for Japan. In 2010, following an incident on the disputed Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese), China was accused of banning exports of rare earths to Japan as a punitive measure. This claim is disputed, but regardless of whether or not it is true, Japan started to see Chinese dependence as a risk. Indeed, China is not only the biggest regional rival but also its biggest trade partner.

Japan-China relations took another massive hit in November 2025, when the then newly elected Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi commented that a Chinese attempt to use military force to occupy Taiwan could be considered a direct security risk for Japan and would thus justify the involvement of the Japanese self-defence force. While the Japanese constitution’s article 9 prohibits the use of force in solving international disputes, successive administrations in the Japanese government have interpreted this clause in an increasingly liberal manner, arguing that it does not prohibit Japan from self-defence. This comment by the Japanese leader was enough to spark a diplomatic crisis between the two neighbours, with the Chinese consul general in Osaka making a post on X in November 2025 that was interpreted as suggesting the beheading of the Japanese head of state. The crisis was further escalated when the Chinese government ordered a reduction in the imports of Japanese seafood and issued an official travel advisory against going to Japan.

However it appears that a normalisation of Japan-China relations is not outside of reach. In a policy address in October 2026, the Prime Minister Takaichi described China as an important neighbour and vowed to work towards a stable and cooperative relationship, despite their differences. This could be seen as a rare sign of a willingness to normalise relations and an attempt to de-escalate the situation. Of course, Japan will likely continue down its road of reducing dependence on China while working to diversify its partnerships across the globe; however, China will remain Japan’s largest trading partner for the foreseeable future, and a stable relationship between the two economic giants would not only be mutually beneficial but would also contribute to stability in the whole region.

Auteur(e): Benjamin Faarvang

Date de publication: 12 octobre 2026

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